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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
WAYS OF NECESSITY-IMPLIED IN LAW OR
IMPLIED IN FACT
Condry v. Laurie1
The complainants-appellees instituted suit to enjoin the
defendant-appellant from interfering with the complain-
ants' use of a private road over the property of the de-
fendant.
It appeared that the complainants and the defendant
owned adjoining parcels of land, the defendant's parcel ad-joining the county road and the complainants' parcel being
an inner lot and not adjoining the county road. Both
parties derived their respective titles from a common
grantor. In 1920, the common grantor conveyed the inner
parcel to the complainants' predecessors in title who were
given in the deed a "license to use the private road from
the County Road to and from the property now conveyed
.. while they shall remain owners of this property".2 The
complainants purchased this inner parcel in 1941.
At the trial, the defendant offered evidence to show
that the complainants had acquired in 1943 another parcel
of land adjacent to, and south of, the parcel purchased in
1941, that they could reach the county road by way of a
road along this adjacent land and that this road was open
to the public. The Court refused to receive further evi-
dence on these matters and granted an injunction, en-
joining the defendant from interfering with the complain-
ants' use of the road. The decree was based on the ground
that the complainants were entitled to the use of the road
as a way of necessity.
Upon appeal the decree was reversed and the case re-
manded with instructions to the trial Court to receive
additional evidence for the purpose of determining
whether or not the complainants had access to the county
road by means of another way other than over the land of
the defendant. The position of the Court of Appeals may
be fairly stated to have been that the complainants were
entitled to a way of necessity, that a way of necessity con-
tinues to exist only so long as the necessity exists, and
that if the complainants had other means of access to the
county road, their way of necessity was extinguished.
Judge Henderson filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Judge Grason joined, taking the position that a way of
1 184 Md. 317, 41 A. 2d 66 (1944).
I Ibid, 184 Md. 319, 41 A. 2d 67.
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necessity arises by virtue of the implied intent of the
parties to a grant, that the license given in the deed of
the complainants' grantor indicated an intention not to
create a way of necessity, that the complainants could ac-
quire no greater rights than their grantor, and that the bill
should be dismissed.
These two opposing views raise the interesting ques-
tion as to the right of a remote grantee to claim an ease-
ment by way of necessity where the immediate grantee
has never claimed nor opened such a way.
The answer depends on what legal concept is adopted
with respect to the creation of a way of necessity and the
nature of the incidents logically flowing from its creation.s
The majority opinion states that "it is universally ac-
cepted that where a person conveys to another a parcel of
land surrounded by other land and there is no access to the
land thus conveyed except over the grantor's land, the
grantor gives the grantee by implication a right of way
over his own land to the land conveyed by him".4 The
doctrine is based upon social policy which favors the full
utilization and occupancy of land. The law follows the
dictates of this policy and will imply the grant. But accord-
ing to the Court: "it is only brought into existence from
the necessities of the estate granted".5 In other words, the
basis of the implication is the necessity of ingress and
egress over the grantor's land. It is imposed by law regard-
less of the intent of the parties. The easement does not
arise from the presumed intent of the parties to the deed.
On the other hand, we find that the dissent adopts the
concept that a way of necessity arises from the presump-
tion that it was the intention of the parties that the grantee
should have access to his lands over the lands of the
grantor. Strictly speaking, the necessity itself does not
create the way. It is merely evidence of the intent of the
parties. The presumption that the parties intended a way
of necessity to arise can be rebutted by the evidence de-
rived from reference to the terms of the deed, to extrinsic
acts of the parties, and to the surrounding circumstances.
It is believed that, upon careful analysis, both these
opposing views contain elements which should be con-
sidered as underlying the basic principles governing the
a The scope of this note is limited to -the legal concept of the creation of
a way of necessity by implied grant to the extent that it bears on the above-
stated right of a remote grantee; the note does not purport to concern it-
self with the creation of a way of necessity by implied reservation.
4Supra, n. 1, 184 Md. 321, 41 A. 2d 68.
1 Quoting Oliver v. Hook, 47 Md. 201, 309 (1877).
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creation of a way of necessity although each concept has
over-emphasized an essential characteristic out of its
proper proportion.
Did the complainants' grantors, the licensees, have a
way of necessity? This question is left unanswered by the
Court. From the language used it would seem, by implica-
tion, that the Court would answer the question affirma-
tively. After holding that the complainants' grantors ac-
quired a mere personal license to use the road over the de-
fendant's land, the Court, without citing any authority
therefor, states: "when the licensees were no longer own-
ers of the property, succeeding owners were still entitled
to a way of necessity, although the way might not neces-
sarily be same as that used by the licensees".6 What is the
meaning of those words?
If it is assumed, that in the opinion of the Court, a way
of necessity was not created out of the deed of 1920 and
that therefore the complainants' grantors did not possess a
way of necessity, on what theory can it be said that the
complainants were entitled to a way of necessity? It is
difficult to conceive of any theory, if the orthodox doctrine
is accepted that a way of necessity arises by implication out
of a grant. There is simply no grant to which we can look
for its creation.
On the other hand, the logical inference from the
Court's language seems to be that the licensees did have a
way of necessity over the defendant's land, although the
way was never located nor used (since the licensees passed
to and fro by virtue of their license7 and therefore had no
occasion to claim the way) yet that this way, although in-
choate and dormant, so to speak, became appurtenant to
the land of the licensees; that the way passed to subsequent
grantees as an easement appurtenant, ready to rise and
spring up in the future, when the necessity for its existence
arose,s as when the license was terminated by the convey-
ance to the complainants. But, if the above be true, what
becomes of the proposition that the fact of necessity gives
6 Supra, n. 1, 184 Md. 323, 41 A. 2d 69.
7In Smyles v. Hastings, 22 N. Y. 217 (1860), it was held that where
there was no occasion for the intermediate grantees to assert the claim
to a right of way by necessity, because the land was wild and unimproved,
until it was acquired by a remote grantee, the right had never been lost.
8 Quaere: Granted that the way became appurtenant and a remote grantee
assert a claim to use the way, if the necessity arose, and granted further
that a way of necessity lasts only so long as the necessity lasts, does the
cessation of the necessity in a remote grantee so extinguish the way that
the necessity subsequently arising in a still more remote grantee would be
ineffective to give rise to "rejuvenate" the way?
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rise to the implied grant of the way of necessity on which
proposition the Court placed reliance and approved in its
opinion?' For in 1920, there was no necessity. The grantees
in the 1920 deed were given a license. It would seem that
the two propositions are therefore contradictory and both
cannot stand vis-a-vis. And it is felt that this seeming con-
flict can only be resolved if we conceive of the "necessity"
as being one of physical fact, as being concerned only with
the physical characteristics and interrelationship of the
dominant and servient estates and as having no concern
whatsoever with what legal rights or privileges pro tern
the grantees and succeeding owners may possess.
If then it is conceded that out of the grant of 1920 to
the complainants' grantor, a way of necessity was created
and this way became appurtenant to the dominant estate,
although it was never located nor used, the logical result
would be that any and all subsequent grantees of the
dominant estate ad infinitum could claim a way of neces-
sity over the servient land whenever and however the
necessity for such a way arose. This result would seem to
be unduly harsh and restrictive of the grantor's freedom
of contract. This objection is the underlying thought be-
hind the dissenting opinion. If the way, in such circum-
stances as in the principal case, is to become appurtenant
to the dominant estate and subsequent grantees of such
estate can claim and assert the way whenever they can
show the necessity therefor, how can the owner of the
servient estate, the common grantor, protect himself from
the possibility that at some future time, a remote grantee
will assert a claim?
This question is answered by the dissenting opinion.
A way of necessity, asserts the dissenting opinion, is cre-
ated to effectuate the presumed intention of the parties.
The presumption is rebuttable. "Any language in a deed
that fairly indicates an intention not to create an easement
by necessity will prevent its creation"."° The license in
the deed of 1920 negated an intention to create a way of
necessity." The reasoning of the dissenting opinion con-
tains unanswerable logic within itself. The difficulty is in
its major premise, to wit, that a way of necessity is merely
O.There is authority for the proposition that at the time of severance,
necessity for the way must exist. See: Seymour v. Lewis, 13 N. a. Eq. 439
(1861), 78 Am. Dec. 108; Central Railroad Co. v. Valentine, 29 N. J. L. 561
(1862) ; DeLuze v. Bradbury, 25 N. J. Eq. 70 (1879) ; Connor v. Boyd, 73
Pa. 179 (1873).
10 Supra, n. 1, 184 Md. 326, 41 A. 2d 70.
11 Moreover, the complainants were chargeable with notice, the deed of
1920 being a matter of public record.
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created to effectuate the presumed intention of the
parties.12
If this concept of the way is accepted, the argument
that the intention may be rebutted by words in the deed"
seems unanswerable. But, if we accept the view that the
law will imply the way for reasons of social policy (as-
suming the necessity exists) it would seem that no words,
however strong or express, would rebut the presump-
tion. Considerations of social policy would be overriding.14
In the last analysis, then, the conflict between the two
opposing views may be described as one of social policy
for the full utilization of land versus a social policy in
favor of freedom of contract.
Broadly speaking, it is felt that in the principal case,
the result reached by the Court is the better and more
justifiable one, although it is not clear in the light of well-
accepted principles governing the creation of ways of
necessity how the Court reached its result.
12 Professor Simonton in an interesting and exhaustive study has severely
criticized the concept that a way of necessity arises from the presumed in-
tention of the parties. "I.t is evident that the easement by necessity Is
imposed by operation of law, regardless of the knowledge of the parties
as to the circumstances, and regardless of their actual intent, unless such
intent be expressed. The attempt to base the easement on the presumed
Intent of the parties was doubtless due to the mode of juristic thinking
of that period. During the 19th century, courts tried to simulate every-
thing to property and there was a strong tendency to reduce everything
in the nature of a legal transaction to contract. The notion was that rights
arose because of the exercise of the wills of individuals, and so the attempt
was made to have the easement by necessity appear to be due to an agree-
ment of the parties. It is not strange that the judges concluded that the
easement by necessity arose because of the presumed Intent of the parties
. ..This explanation was doubtless quite satisfactory to the mind of the
jurist of the middle of the last century . . . [but] . . . confusion has
frequently resulted where what is really a fiction is referred to as the
intent of the parties." Simovton, Ways By Necessity (1926) 33 W. Va.
L. Q. 64, 69.
13 It has been found necessary, as a result, in some states, to enact statues
authorizing private land owners to condemn land for right of way pur-
poses in cases where the condemnor's land is land-locked. See: Note,
Highways-Right 01 Access by Private Road Across Intervening Land-
Decree of Necessity Required to Sustain Right [Kentucky], 1939) 24 Wash.
U. L. Q. 275.
14 In the principal case, if the deed of 1920 had made an express grant
of a right of way to complainants' predecessors as opposed to a mere
license, it would seem, that the Court would still have held that a way of
necessity arose by Implication. See: Uhl v. Ohio River R. Co., 47 W. Va.
59. 34 S. E. 934 (1899).
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